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We study the computational complexity of problems involving equilibria in strategic games
and in perfect information extensive games when the number of players is large. We
consider, among others, the problems of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
in strategic games or deciding the existence of a pure Nash or a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium with a given payoff in ﬁnite perfect information extensive games. We address
the fundamental question of how can we represent a game with a large number of players? We
propose three ways of representing a game with different degrees of succinctness for the
components of the game. For perfect information extensive games we show that when the
number of moves of each player is large and the input game is represented succinctly these
problems are PSPACE-complete. In contraposition, when the game is described explicitly
by means of its associated tree all these problems are decidable in polynomial time. For
strategic games we show that the complexity of deciding the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium depends on the succinctness of the game representation and then on the size
of the action sets. In particular we show that it is NP-complete, when the number of
players is large and the number of actions for each player is constant, and that the problem
is Σ p2 -complete when the number of players is a constant and the size of the action sets
is exponential in the size of the game representation. Again when the game is described
explicitly the problem is decidable in polynomial time.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many situations involving interactions between independent agents can be modeled and analyzed by game theory. Game
theory has been successfully applied to economics and computer science, among other disciplines. In recent times a lot of
attention has been devoted to the computational aspects of game theory and specially to the relationship between Internet
and games [33]. Finding Nash equilibria of games is central to game theoretical analysis and computing such equilibria is
the principal aim of algorithmic game theory. The fundamental question posed by Papadimitriou [33] about the complexity
of computing a Nash equilibrium in two player strategic games has initiated a line of research towards understanding the
complexity of computing a pure or a mixed Nash equilibrium [15,16,13,24,7,22,12,28,29].
In this work our aim is to study the computational complexity of problems related to the existence of pure Nash equi-
libria in multiplayer games. In order to do this we need to deﬁne an appropriate representation for games that has enough
structure to allow non-trivial theoretical analysis of these computational problems.
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We note that, for any problem on games to be computationally meaningful, the number of players or the number of actions
or both should scale. An explicit description of a strategic game with n players and m actions for each player requires mn
payoff values. Moreover, if we consider perfect information extensive games, an explicit description of a game tree of depth l
requires O (ml) internal nodes. Instead of representing all these components only explicitly we introduce other compact ways
to represent them.
Each component of a game, a set or a function, can be described explicitly by means of a list or a table, or implicitly
via a computation model, for example a Turing machine, which decides a set or computes a function. Depending on how
we describe each component we deﬁne three forms for representing a game each of them with a different degree of
succinctness: the explicit form in which all the components of the game are given explicitly, the general form in which only
the utility functions are described implicitly, and ﬁnally the implicit form in which both, the utility functions and the sets of
actions, are described implicitly.
Equilibria problems on strategic and extensive games. Once we have ﬁxed the game representation we study the compu-
tational complexity of problems when the input game is strategic and when it is a perfect information extensive game.
Recall that strategic games are one shot games in the sense that there is no interaction between players, i.e. they play
simultaneously and independently only once. In contraposition extensive games provide a natural way to model interactions
between players that involve sequential decisions. The game can be represented by a tree of decision nodes, where actions
are represented as labeled arcs in the tree. In a perfect information game, each player has complete information of the game’s
history. That is, each player can identify uniquely its current node at any time of the play. In an imperfect information game,
players are uncertain about which node they are currently in. We will consider in this paper only extensive games with
perfect information.
For extensive games there is a stronger notion of Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The existence
of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and therefore of a Nash equilibrium was answered positively since it was shown
that any ﬁnite extensive game with perfect information has a subgame perfect Nash equilibria [27]. Hence in the case of
extensive games we study the complexity of deciding the existence of Nash equilibria or subgame perfect Nash equilibria
that satisfy certain properties. Most of the algorithms and complexity results related to extensive games deal with imperfect
information games. It seems that perfect information games have attracted less attention because a Nash equilibrium can
be computed using backward induction [31]. This is not the case for imperfect information games. Even though backward
induction provides us an algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium, it seems to have two limitations. The ﬁrst one is that,
in general, it is not possible to use it to obtain a Nash equilibrium with a required payoff value for some player or some
other required property. The second one is that the algorithm needs time and space proportional to the size of the tree
of the game. When one thinks on traditional games requiring sequential decisions like Chess, Geography and other games
considered in the computational complexity literature [32,23], the tree of the game is exponentially large with respect to
the size of the description of the game, thus backward induction will require exponential space. This fact leads us to study
the complexity of deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium with particular properties for the case of perfect information
extensive games when the game trees might have large size.
In this paper we focus on the study of problems related to the following questions both for strategic and extensive
games:
• Decide whether a given strategy proﬁle is a pure Nash equilibrium (IsPN).
• The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (EPN).
• Decide whether there is a pure Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrst player gets at least a given payoff value (PNGrant).
We also consider the above questions formulated for best response strategies, the IsBR and BRGrant problems. And
similar questions for extensive games in which we replace Nash equilibria by subgame perfect Nash equilibria (IsSPN and
SPNGrant) or changing the given strategy by a given outcome (IsPNOut, IsSPNOut and IsBROut).
Our contribution. We use standard terminology for classical complexity classes like AC0, P, NP, coNP, DP, Σ p2 and PSPACE
[3,32]. Our results include a characterization of the complexity of all the problems introduced above. We summarize them
in Table 1, observe how the different degrees of succinctness in the representation of games captures different degrees of
computational complexity for the same equilibrium problems.
In the case of extensive games, the main diﬃculty in ﬁnding algorithms for deciding equilibria properties is that the
strategy proﬁle requires space proportional to the size of the tree of the game in order to be represented. This means that if
we do not have an alternative way to represent a Nash equilibrium, then the space needed to describe a Nash equilibrium
is exponential with respect to the input size when the game is given in a succinct way. One of the main contributions of
this work is to provide recursive characterizations of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, or a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, with a guaranteed payoff for the ﬁrst player in terms of histories instead of strategy proﬁles. This is crucial from
the complexity point of view since a history requires only polynomial space in the number of sequential moves (depth of
the game tree) and the length of the actions, while a strategy proﬁle might require exponential space in the number of
sequential moves.
Using these characterizations for extensive games with perfect information we show that when the number of moves of
each player is large and the input game is represented in implicit form or in general form, the problems IsPNout, IsSPNout,
1174 C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197Table 1
Summary of complexity results. We use the suﬃx C in a class to denote the subclass of complete problems, PSPACE-C for PSPACE-complete, and so on,
T for trivial property, and – for does not apply.
Problem Game type and representation
Extensive Strategic
Implicit General Explicit Implicit General Explicit
Strategy IsPN coNP-C coNP-C P coNP-C P P
Is IsSPN coNP-C coNP-C P – – –
IsBR coNP-C coNP-C P coNP-C P P
Exists EPN T T T Σ p2 NP-C AC
0
Exists with guarantees PNGrant PSPACE-C PSPACE-C P Σ p2 NP-C [24] P
SPNGrant PSPACE-C PSPACE-C P – – –
BRGrant NP-C NP-C P NP-C P P
Outcome IsPNOut PSPACE-C PSPACE-C P – – –
Is IsSPNOut PSPACE-C PSPACE-C P – – –
IsBROut coNP-C coNP-C P – – –
PNGrant, and SPNGrant are PSPACE-complete, while the BRGrant is NP-complete. In contraposition, when the input game
is described explicitly by means of its associated tree all these problems are in P. For the case of IsPN, IsSPN, IsBR, and
IsBROut we also show that the complexity increases when the degree of succinctness increases: they belong to P when the
input game is represented in explicit form while they are coNP-complete for implicit and general representations.
For strategic games we show that the complexity of equilibria problems also depends on the representation form of the
input games, even more dramatically than in the extensive games equilibria problems. We show that deciding the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium depends on the succinctness of the game representation and then on the size of the action sets
with respect to the input length. In particular, we show that in the implicit representation where the size of action sets
may be exponential in the length of the input, then EPN and EPNGrant are Σ p2 -complete (even with a ﬁxed number of
players k  3). Contrasting with this, when the representation of the input game is the general form, these problems are
NP-complete in the case of a large number of players and P-complete in the case of a ﬁxed number of players k  2. In
both cases the size of the action sets is proportional to the input length. Finally, in the explicit representation we show that
both problems belong to the low parallel complexity class AC0. Note that in this representation form not only the action
sets but also the strategy proﬁle space have size proportional to the input length.
For the remaining equilibria and best response problems for strategic games we can see in Table 1 that they are hard
for the implicit form representation. Contrasting with this all these problems can be solved in polynomial time when
the input games are represented in general or in explicit form. In these problems the use of general or explicit form is
indistinguishable from the complexity point of view. Note that in both cases the number of actions available to any player
and the time to evaluate the utility functions is polynomial in the size of the input game.
We also study a uniform version of problems on games. In the literature appears another common notion, a game
with polynomial time computable utilities [24,13]. A motivating example is the one of Congestion games proposed in [13] (see
also [26]). Here, the game can be described by a Turing machine that is used to compute the payoff functions for the
different games that arise when we consider different number of players as well as different number of resources. Thus, in
contrast with our previous consideration, here the game is described uniformly by a Turing machine. This notion leads us
to consider families of games that can be deﬁned uniformly in the sense that there is a dtm working in polynomial time
that describes the utilities when the game is played with different number of players and/or different sets of actions. In this
case we can again consider uniform families deﬁned in general or implicit forms.
Our results for the uniform version of equilibria problems on games include the study of strategic games as well as
the perfect information extensive games. The techniques used to prove them are an adapted version of those used for the
non-uniform version and we show analogous results. When we consider families of strategic games deﬁned uniformly and
implicitly from a polynomial time deterministic Turing machine M , we show that the SPN problem is in Σ p2 . Furthermore
we show that there are Turing machines for which the problem is Σ p2 -hard. Contrasting with this, when the representation
of the games is in general form the positive and hardness results are for the NP class. When we consider families of
extensive games deﬁned uniformly we show that PNGrant is in PSPACE using the general form representation as well as
using the implicit representation. We also show that there are Turing machines for which the problem is PSPACE-hard.
Related results. We would like to point out that several researchers have obtained related results from the time of the
publication of part of the results contained in this work in the proceedings of conferences MFCS 05 and ISAAC 05 [2,1].
When we started this work there were many studies on complexity results for equilibria problem for different families of
strategic games, most of them showing either membership in P or hardness results for some complexity class. However,
there was not a proposal that consider the representation of a game, as a generic tool for representing any strategic game
with computable utilities. This framework should serve to obtain tight complexity bounds (especially upper bounds) for
problems on games.
Our main inspiration comes from the work of Gottlob, Grecco, and Scarcello [24] where they consider strategic games
whose utility functions are polynomial time computable. Therefore, we started to develop non-uniform and uniform models
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form games considered in [24] (see also [25]) can be seen as a subclass of our general form games, in the sense that their
general form games can be classiﬁed as non-uniform general form with a O (nk) time bound, for some k.
Related to computing equilibria in multi-player games, C.H Papadimitriou and T. Roughgarden initiate in [34] the algo-
rithmic study of ﬁnding Nash and correlated equilibria in games with a large number of players. They remark that these
games must be presented in some succinct way. Instead of deﬁning a general framework to represent multi-player games as
we do in this work, they focus their study on three well known classes of structured multi-player games: Symmetric games,
Graphical games, and Congestion games. They present several results related to the computation of correlated equilibria in
these classes of games. Following the same line Papadimitriou in [35] develops a polynomial time algorithm for ﬁnding
correlated equilibria in a broad class of succinctly representable multiplayer games. Jointly with the classes cited above he
also considers Hypergraphical games, Local Effect games, Scheduling games, and Network Design games. In [12] the authors
focus their study in equilibria problems in games that are deﬁned on highly regular graphs.
Another sequence of results resolved the question of the complexity of the computational problem of ﬁnding a mixed
Nash equilibrium which had remained opened for more than half century. It was shown in [9] that the problem for normal
form games, that is strategic games in explicit form, is PPAD-complete for the case of 4 players; this was subsequently
improved to 3 players [5,10] and later to 2 players [6]. Subsequently C. Daskalakis, A. Fabrikant and C. Papadimitriou in [8]
extend the previous results to what they say essentially all known kinds of succinct representations of games. The Mixed Nash
equilibrium problem for these classes of games can also be reduced to the two-player case.
G. Schoenebeck and S. Vadhan in [36] also study two models of concisely represented games: circuit games, where the
payoffs are computed by a given boolean circuit, and graphical games, where the player’s payoff is a function of only the
strategies played by its neighbors in a given graph. For these models they study the complexity of some equilibria related
questions. Once more the authors focus their study in these two classes of multi-player games that can be represented
succinctly. They prove a similar result to ours for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in circuit games. Note that in
our representations of games the payoff functions are described using Turing machines, a general computation model. The
main idea behind our proposal of succinct representations is to use this computation model in order to describe succinctly
the components of the game that may enlarge the size of the game description.
M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, and K. Wagner in [28] introduce a class of succinct games, called weighted boolean formula
games. In those games there are n players, each player controls a set of m variables and their utility is obtained as a linear
combination of a set of r boolean formulas. The paper provides complexity results for the existence and computation of
pure Nash equilibria among other problems. The complexity results depend on which subset of the parameters (n,m, r)
is assumed to be a ﬁxed constant. In particular it is shown that deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is
Σ
p
2 -complete when r is constant. This is an extension of our hardness result for a subclass of games in implicit form.
J. Gabarró, A. García, and M. Serna in [19] analyze the complexity of equilibria problems for a class of strategic zero-sum
games, called Angel–Daemon games. Those games were introduced to assess the goodness of a web or grid orchestration on
a faulty environment with bounded amount of failures [17,21]. It turns out that Angel–Daemon games are a natural example
of zero-sum games succinctly described in which deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is Σ p2 -complete [19].
Besides this result, the paper extends the complexity classiﬁcation of the EPN problem by showing that it remains
Σ
p
2 -complete for zero-sum games in implicit form. They also prove that deciding whether a dominant strategy exists is
Σ
p
2 -complete, for Angel–Daemon games, strategic games in implicit form, and zero-sum games in implicit form.
Further results for complexity of pure Nash equilibrium have appeared for graphical games [14,11], symmetric games [4],
and Bayesian games [24]. The complexity of problems related to game isomorphism has been analyzed for games in general
or explicit form, formula games, and weighted boolean formula games in [20] (see also [18]).
2. Deﬁnitions
The following is the mathematical deﬁnition of strategic and perfect information extensive games borrowed form [31].
Deﬁnition 2.1. A strategic game Γ is deﬁned by a tuple Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) where
• N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players.
• For each player i ∈ N , Ai is a ﬁnite set of actions.
• And ui is the utility (or payoff ) function, for each player i ∈ N mapping A1 × . . . × An to rationals.
Now we state the deﬁnition of ﬁnite extensive games with perfect information. We have expressed some conditions
using standard Computer Science notation for alphabets, words, languages and concatenation.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A ﬁnite extensive game with perfect information is deﬁned by a tuple Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , H, Z , P , (ui)i∈N) where
• N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players.
• For each player i ∈ N , Ai is a ﬁnite set of actions.
1176 C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197Fig. 1. The tree and two strategy proﬁles for the game Γ = (N, A1, A2, H, Z , (ui)i∈N ) with N = {1,2}, action sets A1 = A2 = {a,b}, and history set H =
{λ,b,a,aa,ab,aaa,aba,aaaa,aaaab,abaa,abab}, and terminal history set Z = {b,aaaa,aaab,abaa,abab}.
• H is a ﬁnite set of words deﬁned on the alphabet A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An . Each element of H is called a history. H satisﬁes the
following properties: The empty word λ is a member of H and if h ∈ H all the preﬁxes of h belong to H .
• Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal histories. A history z ∈ H is terminal if and only if z is not a proper preﬁx of any history
h ∈ H .
• P is the player function. P assigns to each non-terminal history, h ∈ H \ Z , a player. P (h) is the player who is allowed
to take an action after the history h. Thus, for any h ∈ H \ Z , if for some action a we have that ha ∈ H then a ∈ AP (h) .
• For each player i ∈ N , ui is the utility function assigning to each terminal history a rational value.
If the set of histories H of an extensive game Γ contains only the empty word, i.e. H = Z = {λ}, we say that Γ is
an empty game. We denote by Γλ(v1, . . . , vn) the empty game that has n players and for each player i, ui(λ) = vi . The
interpretation of an empty game is that no player plays, but player i gets immediately the payoff ui(λ). The length of a game,
length(Γ ), is the length of the longest history in the game. Thus length(Γλ(v1, . . . , vn)) = 0. Given a non-terminal history h,
the set of actions that player P (h) can play after h is next(h) = {a | ha ∈ H}.
An alternative deﬁnition of extensive game with perfect information can be given by means of a rooted tree. The
game tree is a rooted tree with labeled nodes and arcs. We assume that the arcs of the tree are directed from par-
ent to child. We require all the labels in the outgoing arcs of a node to be different. Such a tree deﬁnes a game
Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , H, Z , P , (ui)i∈N) as follows. N is the set of the labels of the internal nodes. For each i ∈ N , Ai is the
set formed with the labels of the outgoing arcs from all nodes labeled i. The word obtained by the concatenation of the
labels in the path from the root to a node u is the history associated to u. H is the set of histories associated to the tree
nodes and Z is the set of histories associated to the tree leaves. The player function assigns to each non-terminal history the
label of its associated node. The leaves of the tree hold a table storing one rational for each player, thus deﬁning the utility
of the associated terminal history for each player. The tree associated to an empty game is a leaf holding the utility values
associated to the history λ. Observe that any subtree of a game tree associated to Γ also deﬁnes a game, we will refer to
those games as the subgames of Γ . We identify a subgame of Γ by the history h that corresponds to the concatenation of
the labels in the arcs in the path from the root of the tree to the root of the subtree.
In the rest of the paper we will make use of the term extensive game to refer to a perfect information extensive game.
Now we turn our attention to how the players play, let us start with strategic games. Given Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) a
strategy si for player i is a selection of an action ai ∈ Ai . In the case of a extensive game with perfect information Γ , for
any player i ∈ N , deﬁne Hi = {h ∈ H | P (h) = i}. Notice that the languages in the collection (Hi)i∈N are pairwise disjoint.
A strategy of player i in Γ is a function si : Hi → Ai that speciﬁes in any possible situation the action taken by player i. We
use Si for the set of strategies for player i.
A strategy proﬁle is a tuple of strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) one for each player. Note that in the case of strategic games
a strategy proﬁle is just a tuple of actions. For extensive games a strategy proﬁle can be seen, over the game tree, as a
selection of an outgoing arc for every internal node (see Fig. 1) or as a function over the set of non-terminal histories
deﬁned as s(h) = sP (h)(h). Observe that in an empty extensive game Γ = Γλ(v1, . . . , vn) the players do not play (Hi = ∅), or
in other words, they play the empty strategy, denoted by ∅, and thus the game has a unique strategy proﬁle.
To each strategy proﬁle s = (s1, . . . , sn) of an extensive game we can associate a terminal history, the outcome of s, denoted
as O (s). The outcome is the terminal history reachable from the root, when each player i ∈ N , follows the precepts of si .
Looking at the tree of the game, the outcome of a strategy proﬁle is the history associated to the unique leaf accessible
from the root following the arcs selected by the strategy proﬁle (see Fig. 1). Note that different strategy proﬁles s and s′
might determine the same outcome as it is shown in Fig. 1.
Finally, we deﬁne the utility for player i of a strategy proﬁle s as the utility for player i of the tuple of actions,
ui(s1, . . . , sn), for strategic games, or the utility for player i of the outcome of s, that is ui(s) = ui(O (s)), when the game is
extensive.
Given a set of players T , a strategy sT for the team T is a collection of strategies (si)i∈T one for each player in T . This set
of strategies for a team can be seen as a function, deﬁned on HT =⋃i∈T Hi , as sT (h) = sP (h)(h). We consider three types of
C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197 1177Fig. 2. Some strategy proﬁles for the game Γ given in Fig. 1. The strategy given in (a) is not a Nash equilibrium. The strategy given in (b) is a Nash
equilibrium, but not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, the strategy (c) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
teams: T = N , in such a case we usually drop the subindex, so s = sN ; T = {i} in this case we forget the team and simply
write si , and, for a player i, T = { j | j 	= i} in this case we use the notation s−i as we have a strategy for all the players
minus player i. Given two teams T and T ′ with T ∩ T ′ = ∅, we denote by (sT , sT ′) the strategy for the team T ∪ T ′ given by
(si)i∈T∪T ′ . Given a strategy proﬁle s = (s1, . . . , sn) and a player i we can factorize s as (s−i, si) where s−i = (s j) j 	=i .
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let Γ be an extensive game, let sT be a strategy for the team T ⊆ N . We say that a history h is compatible
with the strategy sT , if for any preﬁx h′ of h, such that h = h′ah′′ with P (h′) ∈ T , we have that a = sT (h′). We denote by
H(sT ) the set of histories compatible with strategy sT .
Observe that the set H(sT ) contains all those histories in which, when it is the turn of a player in T , the decision on
how to continue is taken according to sT .
For a player i, given a strategy s−i for the team −i, the set of best responses of player i to s−i , denoted by Bi(s−i), is
a set of strategies for player i deﬁned as follows:
Bi(s−i) =
{
si ∈ Si
∣∣ ui(s−i, si) ui(s−i, s′i) for all s′i ∈ Si}.
Notice that for any si ∈ Bi(s−i) we have
ui(s−i, si) = max
s′i∈Si
ui
(
s−i, s′i
)= max
z∈H(s−i)∩Z
ui(z).
Deﬁnition 2.4. A strategy proﬁle s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a pure Nash equilibrium (pne) if for any player i and any s′i ∈ Si we
have ui(s−i, si) ui(s−i, s′i).
In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle s such that, for any player i, si ∈ Bi(s−i).
Extensive games admit a ﬁner version of Nash equilibria called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To deﬁne it we need
the notion of subgame. Given a non-terminal history h, the subgame h−1Γ is what remains of the game Γ after playing h.
This game correspond to the subtree rooted at the node reachable from the root by following h (for a formal deﬁnition see
Section 4). Observe that a strategy proﬁle for Γ induces a strategy proﬁle in any subgame of Γ .
Deﬁnition 2.5. A strategy proﬁle s in Γ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if for every history h, the strategy proﬁle
induced by s on h−1Γ is a Nash equilibrium in h−1Γ .
Observe that for an empty game Γλ the empty strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and thus a Nash
equilibrium. See Fig. 2 for more examples of strategies that are Nash equilibrium and that might or not be subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. The fundamental question of the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the extensive games
considered in this paper, and therefore of a Nash equilibrium, was answered positively. It is known that any ﬁnite extensive
game with perfect information has a subgame perfect Nash equilibria [27].
3. Problems on games and game representations
In this paper we are interested in classifying the computational complexity of several problems related with the existence
of Nash equilibria of a given game. For the extensive games this question was answered positively, as we have already
mentioned, it is known that any ﬁnite extensive game with perfect information has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [27].
Therefore, the problem of the existence of a Nash equilibrium becomes trivial in this case. We analyze the complexity of
such a problem for the case of strategic games as well as the complexity of other related problems: decide whether a given
strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium of a given game, decide whether the pay-off of some Nash equilibrium is equal or
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as for strategic games. We deﬁne them formally as follows:
Is pure Nash equilibrium? (IsPN). Given a game Γ and a strategy proﬁle s, decide whether s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Exists pure Nash equilibrium? (EPN). Given a game Γ decide whether there is a Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Pure Nash equilibrium with guarantee (PNGrant). Given an game Γ , a player i, and a positive number u, decide whether
Γ has a Nash equilibrium s such that ui(s) u.
Moreover when the input is an extensive game, the previous three decisional problems can be reformulated systemati-
cally in terms of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (but we know yet the positive answer of the second one):
Is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? (IsSPN). Given an extensive game Γ and a strategy proﬁle s, decide whether s is
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with guarantee (SPNGrant). Given an extensive game Γ and a positive number u, decide
whether Γ has a Nash equilibrium s such that uP (λ)(s) = u.
For sake of simplicity in subsequent proofs we have considered in the above formulation a guarantee for the utility of the
player that plays ﬁrst. However, the above problem is equivalent to the corresponding problem in which a player i is given
as part of the input and we ask whether ui(s) = u.
We are also interested in studying the complexity of some problems related to the concept of best response.
Is best response? (IsBR). Given a game Γ , a player i, a strategy for the team −i, s−i and a strategy si for player i, decide
whether si ∈ Bi(s−i).
Best response with guarantee (BRGrant). Given a game Γ , a player i, a strategy for the team −i, s−i and a value u,
decide whether there is s′i ∈ Bi(s−i) for which ui(s−i, s′i) u.
All the previous problems can be stated for both extensive and strategic games. For the case of extensive games we can
also consider versions of some of those problems in which the input is a history of the game, instead of a strategy, and the
question relates to properties of the outcome of some strategy.
Is pure Nash equilibrium outcome? (IsPNOut). Given a game Γ and a terminal history z, decide whether z is the outcome
of a Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome? (IsSPNOut). Given an extensive game Γ and a terminal history z, decide
whether z is the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ .
Is best response outcome? (IsBROut). Given a game Γ , a player i, a strategy for the team −i, s−i and a strategy si for
player i, and a terminal history z, decide whether there is si ∈ Bi(s−i) for which O (s−i, si)) = z.
In order to study the computational complexity of all these problems it is fundamental to deﬁne how an input game Γ
is represented. Notice that the complexity of a problem is always analyzed with respect to the size of the input. It is clear
that the size of a game representation depends mainly on the number of players and on the size of the action set. And, in
the same way, the utility function of each player, which is also part of the game description, depends on the number of
strategy proﬁles. Because of these, we have to make clear how to describe the set of players, and for each player their set of
actions and utility functions. Depending on the succinctness of the description of the action sets and depending on whether
the pay-off functions are described implicitly by Turing machines (tm) or, explicitly, by tables, we propose three different
ways of describing games.
Before giving the details of the representations let us consider some particular aspects of the tm model used in the
description of the pay-off functions. We assume that all are deterministic and we use the following convention: there is
a pre-ﬁxed interpretation of the contents of the output tape of a tm so that, both when the machine stops or when the
machine is stopped, it always computes a value. Let also assume that Σ is a pre-ﬁxed alphabet. Hence we can describe
the pay-off functions of a game by giving a tuple 〈M,1t〉 where M is a deterministic tm(dtm) and t is a natural number
bounding its computation time. The interpretation is that given a tuple of actions, or a terminal history, and a natural
number i, the output of M is the value of the pay-off function of the i-th player on the corresponding tuple of actions or
history.
In the following we deﬁne three ways of representing games as inputs of algorithms. First, we consider a way of de-
scribing the set of actions in which they are not given explicitly and directly, by listing all their actions, but succinctly and
implicitly. We are interested in descriptions whose length does not depend dramatically on the number of the actions, but
depends on the length of the actions. Such descriptions are exponentially more succinct than the sets they describe. The
following deﬁnition captures this idea.
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player i, their set of actions is Ai = Σm and 〈M,1t〉 is the description of the pay-off functions.
Notice that in this case the length of the representation is proportional to n the number of players, to m the length of
the actions (and then logarithmic to the number of different actions), and to t the computation time of the pay-off func-
tions. Observe that this type of representation includes the circuit games considered in [24,36]. The second representation is
deﬁned by considering that the set of actions of each player is given explicitly.
Strategic games in general form. A game Γ is represented by a tuple 〈1n, A1, . . . , An,M,1t〉. It has n players, for each
player i, their set of actions Ai is given by listing all its elements. The description of their pay-off functions is given by
〈M,1t〉.
In the general form the length of representation of Γ is proportional to the number of different actions instead of their
length, and as in the implicit case, proportional to n and t . Finally we consider a less succinct way to describe games. This
is the usual description adopted in basic books giving us a complete description in form of a bimatrix or trimatrix (set of
bimatrices).
Strategic games in explicit form. A game Γ is represented by a tuple 〈1n, A1, . . . , An, T 〉. It has n players, and for each
player i, their set of actions Ai is given explicitly. T is a table with an entry for each strategy proﬁle a and a player i. In
this case ui(a) = T (a, i).
In the case of the extensive games we also consider that the different components of a game can be given with different
degrees of succinctness. The action sets can be described as in the case of strategic games and the player and the utility
functions can also be given tabulated or by means of Turing machines. In the following P and M denote the tms computing
the player and utility functions, respectively, and t denotes the computation time bound. The player machine P implements
a player function according to the following convention: Given an input sequence h, P computes in time at most t an
integer; if P (h) ∈ {1, . . . ,n} its value is equal to the value of the player function on history h; if P (h) = 0 indicates that
h ∈ Z ; otherwise P indicates that h /∈ H . The utility machine M on input (z, i), where z ∈ Z , outputs in at most t steps ui(z).
We consider three natural ways of representing an extensive game, according to the succinctness of actions, player function,
and utilities, using similar criteria to those proposed for strategic games. In the following deﬁnitions t is the computation
time bound for any tm appearing in the description.
Extensive games in implicit form. A game Γ is represented by a tuple 〈1n,1m,1h, P ,M,1t〉. This game has n players.
For any i, 1 i  n, the set of actions of player i is Σm . The set H of histories is a subset of Σmh and 〈M,1t〉, 〈P ,1t〉
are the descriptions of the utility and player functions respectively.
Notice that in the implicit form representation, the size of the game tree of Γ is proportional to |Σ |mh and then expo-
nential with respect to the length of its representation.
Extensive games in general form. A game Γ is represented by a tuple 〈1n, A1, . . . , An,1h, P ,M,1t〉. The game has n
players. For any i, 1  i  n, the set of actions of player i is Ai , which is given explicitly. The set H of histories is
a subset of (
⋃
1in Ai)
h and 〈M,1t〉, 〈P ,1t〉 are the descriptions of the utility and player functions respectively.
Similarly to the implicit form, in the general form representation the size of the game tree of Γ is proportional to
(
∑n
i=1 |Ai |)h , end hence exponential to the length of the Γ description.
Extensive games in explicit form. A game Γ is represented by 〈1n, T 〉. The game has n players and T is the game tree,
with the adequate labellings.
Observe that, for extensive games, the strategy of a player i speciﬁes the action to be applied in any internal node of
the game tree which is labeled by i. Hence, an explicit description of a strategy has size proportional to the game tree
size. Therefore, it can be exponential in the length of the game representation in the cases of implicit and general forms.
Because of this we consider also an implicit representation of strategies. To deﬁne it, recall that each node in the game tree
is uniquely described by a history h. In particular, an implicit representation of a strategy is a tm S , the global strategy tm,
that on any non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z outputs the action to be undertaken by P (h), the player that is allowed to play,
formally S(h) ∈ AP (h) .
1 In the games in implicit form we assume Ai = Σm , this is not a major restriction because we can also consider Ai ⊆ Σm with just small modiﬁcations.
In this case Γ = 〈1n,1m,M1, . . .Mn,M,1t 〉 with M1, . . . ,Mn,M being dtm. The game is played by n players. For each player i, Mi is a succinct description
of their set of actions Ai ⊆ Σm . We say that ai ∈ Ai iff Mi accepts ai in at most t steps. Given a = (a1, . . . ,an) and i ∈ N , ui(a) is the output of M(a, i)
after at most t steps.
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When the input of a problem is an extensive game and a strategy, we assume that the strategy will be described by
the implicit representation deﬁned above if the game representation is implicit or general. If the input game is described
in explicit form, the strategy will also be represented in explicit form, i.e. associating a unique action to each node of the
game tree.
For the sake of simplicity whenever the input to a problem is a game and a strategy we will incorporate a unique time
bound that will be used in all the tm involved in the input’s description.
4. A succinct way of describing equilibria in extensive games
In this section we focus on the problem of determining if a given terminal history of an extensive game is the outcome
of a Nash equilibrium or the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We provide a characterization of the outcomes
of Nash equilibria and of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The recursive nature of our characterizations is the basis for the
design of eﬃcient algorithms. We need to introduce additional notation and operations on games and strategies. Let us start
recalling the deﬁnition of some basic operations on languages (sets of histories) and functions. Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗
and given a word h ∈ Σ∗ the language of the right factors of h in L is deﬁned as
h−1L = {w | hw ∈ L}.
Given a function τ : L → B and given a word h ∈ Σ∗ the function induced by τ on the right factors of h is
h−1τ : h−1L → B where h−1τ (w) = τ (hw).
Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗ and a word h ∈ Σ∗ , the concatenation of h and L is the language
hL = {hw | w ∈ L}.
Note that by the associativity of the concatenation, we have that
h−12
(
h−11 L
)= {w ∣∣ h2w ∈ h−11 L}= {w ∣∣ h1(h2w) ∈ L}= {w ∣∣ (h1h2)w ∈ L}= (h1h2)−1L,
h−12
(
h−11 τ
)= (h1h2)−1τ ,
(h1h2)L =
{
(h1h2)w
∣∣ w ∈ L}= {h1(h2w) ∣∣ h2w ∈ h2L}= h1(h2L), and
h−1(hL) = {w | hw ∈ hL} = {w | w ∈ L} = L.
For any history h of Γ , we want to deﬁne formally the notion of subgame. Recall that a subgame corresponds to the
game deﬁned by the subtree rooted at the internal node reachable from the root of Γ following the history h (see Fig. 3).
Deﬁnition 4.1. Given an extensive game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , H, Z , P , (ui)i∈N ) and a history h ∈ H , the subgame after history h is
deﬁned as
h−1Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N ,h−1H,h−1Z ,h−1P , (h−1ui)i∈N).
Observe that the set of players is the same as in Γ , the histories are the right factors of h in H , the player and the payoff
functions are deﬁned on each w , a right factor of h in H , as P and ui were deﬁned on hw ∈ L, respectively. Note that for
any h1h2 ∈ H , it holds (h1h2)−1Γ = h−12 (h−11 Γ ).
Let us consider games that are obtained by composition of different games. In particular, we consider the following
composition operation.
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i ∈ N , and  different actions ai1 , . . .ai of Ai their composition is the game
Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1 . . . Γ) =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , H, Z , P , (ui)i∈N
)
where H = {λ} ∪ ai1H1 ∪ · · · ∪ ai H , Z = ai1 Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ ai Z , for h ∈ H ,
P (h) =
{
i if h = λ,
Pα(hα) if h = aiαhα and hα ∈ Hα \ Zα,
and, for z ∈ Z , ui(z) = uαi (zα) when z = aiα zα .
These compositions of  different subgames Γ1, . . . ,Γ and  different actions ai1 , . . . ,ai of a given player i, correspond
to a game in which “player i starts the game and chooses an action aiα from a set of  different actions ai1 , . . . ,ai , each
selection makes the players continue playing a particular game Γα among a set of  games Γ1, . . . ,Γ”. Observe that the
composition creates a new game tree taking the  trees as subgame trees, adding a new root with label i, and joining this
new root to the root of each subgame Γα with an arc labeled aiα (see Fig. 3).
Any extensive game of positive length Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , H, Z , P , (ui)i∈N ) can be expressed, without ambiguity, as Γ =
Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) where P (λ) = i and next(λ) = {ai1 , . . . ,ai } and Γα = a−1iα Γ , for 1 α  . We use the notation
Γα = (N, (Ai)i∈N , Hα, Zα, Pα, (uαi )i∈N ) where Hα = a−1iα H , Zα = a−1iα Z , Pα = a−1iα P and uαj = a−1iα u j for any player j. For
a player j ∈ N , we deﬁne Hαj = a−1iα H j and Zαj = a−1iα Z j . We use the term composite game to refer to an extensive game with
positive length decomposed in this way.
Let us consider strategies in relation to subgames and composite games. Given a game Γ we have H = Z ∪ H1 ∪ · · · ∪ Hn
where Hi = {h | P (h) = i} for 1 i  n. Note that Z , H1, . . . , Hn is a partition of H , i.e. for any 1 i  n, Hi ∩ Z = ∅, for any
i 	= j, Hi ∩ H j = ∅, therefore H is the union of these n + 1 disjoint sets.
For any team T ⊆ N , a collection of strategies sT = (si)i∈T , where for i ∈ T si : Hi → Ai , can be seen as a function
sT : HT →⋃i∈T Ai such that sT (h) = sP (h)(h).
For a composite game Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) and a team T , we use HαT =
⋃
i∈T Hαi . Recall that HT =
⋃
i∈T Hi .
Let us consider the behavior of collections of strategies in front of subgames.
Deﬁnition 4.3.
• Given a game Γ , a non-terminal history h, and a collection of strategies sT = (si)i∈T , for some team T ⊆ N . The induced
strategy for T in the subgame h−1Γ is h−1sT .
• Given a composite game Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ), for any 1  α  , a collection of strategies sαT = (sαj ) j∈T
in Γ α , for some team T ⊆ N such that i /∈ T , the composed strategy for the team T on Γ , sT = s(s1T , . . . , sT ) is deﬁned
on HT as
sT (h) = sαT
(
hα
)
if h = aiαhα and hα ∈ HαT .
• Given a composite game Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ), for any 1  α  , a collection of strategies sαT = (sαj ) j∈T
in Γ α , for some team T ⊆ N such that i ∈ T , and β ∈ {1, . . . , }, the composed strategy sT = s(aiβ , s1T , . . . , sT ) for the
team T on Γ is deﬁned on HT as follows
sT (h) =
{
aiβ if h = λ,
sαT (h
α) if h = aiαhα and hα ∈ HαT ,
Let Γ be the composite game Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ). Any collection of strategies sT for the team T , for which
i ∈ T and sT (λ) = aiβ , can be expressed as the composition sT = s(aiβ , s1T , . . . , sT ) where, for any 1 α  , sαT = a−1iα sT . In
the case that i /∈ T , sT can be expressed as the composition sT = s(s1T , . . . , sT ) where, for any 1 α  , sαT = a−1iα sT . Notice
that for any strategy proﬁle s such that O (s) = aiβ zβ , we have that zβ = O (sβ), we can also write O (s) = aiβ O (sβ).
Lemma 4.4. Let s be a Nash equilibrium for an extensive game Γ with positive length. If h is a preﬁx of O (s) then h−1s is a Nash
equilibrium for h−1Γ .
Proof. The result holds trivially when |O (s)| = 0 since in this case Γ is an empty game. When |O (s)| > 0, we have a com-
posite game that can be described as Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . .ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ), and without loose of generality we can assume that
O (s) = ai1 z1.
Since O (s) = ai1 O (s1), for any 1  j  n we have u j(s) = u1j (s1). Suppose that s1 = a−1i1 s is not a Nash equilibrium
for Γ1. In this case there is a player j that can change their strategy from s1 to another one t1 in such a way thatj j
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1
− j, t
1
j ) > u
1
j (s
1
− j, s
1
j ). Then, consider the strategy proﬁle v
1 = (s1− j, t1j ) in Γ 1 and the strategy proﬁle s′ in Γ deﬁned
as s′ = s(ai1 , v1, s2 . . . , s). Observe that by construction O (s′) = ai1 O (v1). Therefore, u j(s′) = u1j (v1) > u j(s) and thus s was
not a Nash equilibrium. Using the associativity of concatenation and working by induction the claim follows. 
Note that when s is a Nash equilibrium, if h is not a preﬁx of O (s), it can be the case that h−1s does not induce a Nash
equilibrium in h−1Γ (see Fig. 2). Notice, that when s is a perfect Nash equilibrium, h−1s always is a Nash equilibrium
on h−1Γ .
4.1. A characterization of the outcomes of Nash equilibria
We provide a characterization of the outcomes of a Nash equilibrium. This result is crucial in the analysis of the compu-
tational complexity of problems in which it has to be checked whether a given game has a Nash equilibria satisfying some
given properties. This characterization allows us to reduce the computation space from exponential to polynomial, since
instead of using strategies to decide the existence of Nash equilibria we use histories. Notice that the size of a strategy is
proportional to the size of the game tree, while the size of a history is proportional to the depth of the game tree, that is
the game length. We start with a deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.5 ((i,u)-blocking). Let Γ be an extensive game, i a player, and u a value. We say that Γ is (i,u)-blocking if
length(Γ ) = 0 and ui(λ) u, or if length(Γ ) > 0 and either
• P (λ) 	= i and there is a ∈ next(λ) such that a−1Γ is (i,u)-blocking, or
• P (λ) = i and, for all a ∈ next(λ), the game a−1Γ is (i,u)-blocking.
Our ﬁrst result is a characterization of the previous property in terms of the existence of a team strategy s−i that keeps
player i beneﬁt at most u.
Lemma 4.6. Given an extensive game Γ , a player i and value u, Γ is (i,u)-blocking if and only if there is a strategy proﬁle s−i such
that, for any strategy ti , ui(s−i, ti) u.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the length of the game. For games with length 0 the lemma trivially holds.
In this case we have an empty game, when ui(λ)  u, the empty strategy (with no choices at all) fulﬁlls both conditions.
Assume that the lemma holds for games with length at most k and let Γ = Γ ( j,a j1 , . . . ,a j ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) be a game of
length k.
Assume that Γ is (i,u)-blocking. When j 	= i we know that at least one of the subgames, let us say Γ1, is (i,u)-blocking.
By the induction hypothesis there is a team strategy s1−i in Γ1 such that, for any strategy, t
1
i , u
1
i (s
1
−i, t
1
i ) u. For any α 	= 1,
let sα−i be any strategy for the team −i, and deﬁne s−i = s(a j1 , s1−i, . . . , s−i), and let ti = s(t1i , . . . , ti ) be any strategy for
player i in Γ . Notice that the ﬁrst move in Γ is performed by j ∈ N−i . This player chooses a j1 as a ﬁrst move forcing all the
players to play the subgame Γ1. Hence, ui(s−i, ti) = u1i (s1−i, t1i ). When j = i, we know that all the subgames Γα , 1 α  ,
are (i,u)-blocking, therefore by induction hypothesis, for any 1 α   there is sα−i in Γα such that uαi (sα−i, tαi ) u for any
strategy tαi . Let s−i = s(s1−i, . . . , s−i) and ti be any strategy for player i in Γ with ti(λ) = aiβ . Since i is the ﬁrst player of the
game, ti = s(aiβ , t1i , . . . , ti ) and then ui(s−i, ti) = uβi (sβ−i, tβi ). Since uβi (sβ−i, tβi )  u, by induction hypothesis, in both cases
we have ui(s−i, ti) u.
For the reverse implication, assume that there exists s−i such that for any ti veriﬁes ui(s−i, ti) u. When j 	= i, without
loss of generality, assume that s−i = s(a j1 , s1−i, . . . , s−i). Thus any strategy of player has the form ti = s(t1i , . . . , ti ). Since
O (s−i, ti) = a j1 O (s1−i, t1i ) the utility of player i veriﬁes u1i (s1−i, t1i ) = ui(s−i, ti)  u. Thus, by induction, we have that Γ1
is (i,u)-blocking. When j = i, s−i = s(s1−i, . . . , s−i) and any strategy for player i has the form ti = s(aiβ , t1i , . . . , ti ), where
ti(λ) = aiβ . Since O (s−i, ti) = aiβ O (sβ−i, tβi ), it holds uβi (sβ−i, tβi ) = ui(s−i, ti)  u for any possible choice of aiβ ∈ next(λ).
Therefore by induction hypothesis all the Γα for 1 α   are (i,u)-blocking. 
Our second deﬁnition is the key to capture through a recursive deﬁnition the concept of outcome of a Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Γ -stable). Let Γ be an extensive game and let z be a terminal history in Γ . We say that z is Γ -stable if
|z| = 0 or, otherwise, assuming that Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) and that z = aiβ zβ , for some 1 β  , then
• zβ is Γβ -stable and
• for all 1 α   with α 	= β , Γα is (i,ui(z))-blocking.
An illustration of the deﬁnition of Γ -stable and an example showing the terminal histories that are stable is given in
Fig. 4.
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Theorem 4.8. Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect information. A terminal history z is the outcome of some Nash equilibrium of
Γ iff z is Γ -stable.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of Γ . When length(Γ ) = 0 the unique history λ is the outcome of the empty
strategy, which is a Nash equilibrium, and Γ -stable by deﬁnition. Assume that Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) has length
k and that the theorem holds for any game with length less than k. Without loose of generality we assume that z = ai1 z1.
Let s = (s−i, si) be a Nash equilibrium for Γ such that O (s) = z = ai1 z1. By Lemma 4.4 the strategy s1 = a−1i1 s is a Nash
equilibrium for Γ1 and O (s1) = z1. Therefore, by induction hypothesis z1 is Γ1-stable. Since Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ)
it induces the decomposition s−i = s(s1−i, . . . , s−i). For any 1 < α  , let tαi be any strategy for player i in Γα and deﬁne
vα = (sα−i, tαi ).
Then ui(s) ui(s(aiα , s1, . . . , sα−1, vα, sα+1, . . . , s)), otherwise s will not be a Nash equilibrium. By the factorization of s
we have that ui(s) = u1i (s1) uαi (vα) = uαi (sα−i, tαi ). Hence, for any strategy tαi we have uαi (sα−i, tαi ) ui(z) and then Γα is
(i,ui(z))-blocking, for each 1 < α  .
For the reverse implication assume that z = ai1 z1 is Γ -stable. Since Γ can be expressed as Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ),
we have that z1 is Γ 1-stable. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, there is a Nash equilibrium s1 for Γ 1 such that z1 = O (s1).
Furthermore, for any α 	= 1, Γα is (i,ui(z))-blocking. According to Lemma 4.6 the team −i has a blocking strategy tα−i for Γα .
Let vαi be any strategy for player i in Γα and set w
α = (tα−i, vαi ). Consider the strategy proﬁle σ = s(ai1 , s1,w2, . . . ,w),
notice that O (σ ) = ai1 O (s1) = ai1 z1 = z therefore, for any player j, u j(σ ) = u1j (s) = u j(z). Let s = (s− j, s j) a strategy for
player j.
When j = i, σ−i = s(s1−i, t2−i, . . . , t−i) and σi = s(ai1 , s1i , v2i , . . . vi ). Consider a strategy μi 	= σi . Now we have μi(λ) = ai1
and therefore μi = s(ai1 ,μ1i , . . . ,μi ). Since O (σ−i,μi) = ai1 O (s1−i,μ1i ) we have ui(σ−i,μi) = u1i (s1−i,μ1i ). Moreover
u1i (s
1
−i,μ
1
i ) u1i (s1−i, s1i ) because s1 is a Nash equilibrium in subgame Γ1. Since u1i (s1−i, s1i ) = ui(σ ) we have ui(σ−i,μi)
ui(σ ). On the other hand, whenever μi(λ) 	= ai1 , μi = s(aiα ,μ1i , . . . ,μi ) for some α > 1. Since O (σ−i,μi) = aiα O (tα−i,μαi ),
ui(σ−i,μi) = uαi (tα−i,μαi ). But tα−i is (i,ui(z))-blocking in Γα and it holds uαi (tα−i,μαi )  ui(z). Hence ui(σ−i,μi)  ui(z).
Therefore, player i has no incentive to change its strategy.
When j 	= i, σ− j = s(ai1 , s1− j, t2− j, . . . , t− j) and σ j = s(s1j , v2j , . . . , vj). Let us consider any other strategy μ j =
s(μ1j , . . . ,μ

j) for player j. Note that O (σ− j,μ j) = ai1 O (s1− j,μ1j ) and then we have u j(σ− j,μ j) = u1j (s1− j,μ1j ). Since s1
is a Nash equilibrium in Γ1 we can also conclude that player j has no incentive to change their strategy. 
4.2. A characterization of the outcomes of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
The notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium corresponds to a strategy proﬁle that induces a Nash equilibrium in
any subgame. An alternative characterization of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is given in [30]. Consider the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.9 (Γ -one-deviation). Given an extensive game Γ and a strategy proﬁle s, s satisﬁes the Γ -one-deviation property
if no player i can increase their payoff in the subgame by changing their action at the start of any subgame in which player
i is the ﬁrst mover, given the other player’s strategies and the rest of player i strategy.
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Lemma 4.10. (See [30, Proposition 438.1].) A strategy proﬁle in a ﬁnite extensive game with perfect information is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium iff it satisﬁes the Γ -one-deviation property.
For a given game Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ 1, . . . ,Γ ) and a given strategy proﬁle s = s(aiβ , s1, . . . , s), to say that player i
cannot improve their payoff by changing the ﬁrst move is equivalent to say that for any 1 α   with α 	= β , the strategy
proﬁle t = s(aiα , s1, . . . , s) veriﬁes ui(t)  ui(s). But, as ui(s) = uβi (sβ) and ui(t) = uαi (sα) the inequality translates into
uαi (s
α) uβi (sβ). Therefore the one-deviation property admits the following recursive deﬁnition.
Lemma 4.11. Let Γ be an extensive game. A strategy proﬁle s for Γ satisﬁes the Γ -one-deviation property iff either Γ = Γλ and then
s = ∅ or, otherwise, assuming that Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ 1, . . . ,Γ ) and s = s(aiβ , s1, . . . , s), then
• sβ satisﬁes the Γ β -one-deviation property, and
• for each 1 α   with α 	= β , sα satisﬁes the Γ α-one-deviation property and uαi (sα) uβi (sβ).
For our complexity results we need a further reﬁnement of the above property to transfer the existence of a strategy
proﬁle to the existence of a terminal history that is the outcome of some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consider the
following property deﬁned recursively.
Deﬁnition 4.12 (Γ -ﬁxable). Let Γ be an extensive game and let z be a terminal history in Γ . We say that z is Γ -ﬁxable if
|z| = 0 or, otherwise, assuming that Γ = Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) and that z = aiβ zβ ,
• zβ is Γβ -ﬁxable, and
• for all 1 α   with α 	= β , there is zα ∈ Zα such that uαi (zα) uβi (zβ) and zα is Γα-ﬁxable.
An illustration of the deﬁnition of Γ -ﬁxable and an example showing the terminal histories that are stable is given in
Fig. 5.
Now we can state the characterization of the outcomes of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.13. Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect information and z a terminal history, then z is the outcome of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ iff z is Γ -ﬁxable.
Proof. Let z = O (s) for some strategy proﬁle s in Γ . Let us prove the theorem by induction on the length of Γ . If Γ = Γλ
the empty strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with outcome λ, and, by Deﬁnition 4.12, λ is Γ -ﬁxable.
Assume that Γ has length k and that the theorem holds for games with length less than k. Let us assume that Γ =
Γ (i,ai1 , . . . ,ai ,Γ1, . . . ,Γ) and, without loss of generality, that z = ai1 z1.
Assume that s is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We know that s satisﬁes the Γ -one-deviation property. Since z =
ai1 z
1, s = s(ai1 , s1, . . . , s). From Lemma 4.10 we know that, for any 1 α  , the proﬁle sα veriﬁes the Γ α-one-deviation
and that zα = O (sα). Thus, by induction hypothesis zα is Γ α-ﬁxable. Also by Lemma 4.10, for 1 < β  , uαi (sβ) u1i (s1).
Thus we get uα(zβ) u1(z1), for 1 < β  . Therefore, z is Γ -ﬁxable.i i
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such that uαi (z
α)  u1i (z1). By induction hypothesis, for any 1  α  , there is a strategy proﬁle sα of Γα for which
O (sα) = zα that satisﬁes the Γ α-one-deviation. The additional condition uαi (zα) u1i (z1) guarantees that the strategy proﬁle
s = s(ai1 , s1i , . . . , si ) for Γ satisﬁes the Γ -one-deviation property. Therefore s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, whose
outcome, by construction, is z. 
4.3. Checking properties
Before analyzing the computational complexity of the problems deﬁned in Section 3 we provide some additional results
on the complexity of computing outcomes and utilities or verifying certain properties. The following result is straightfor-
ward.
Lemma 4.14. Given an extensive game Γ and a strategy proﬁle s, computing the functions O (s) or ui(s), for any player i, requires
polynomial time independently of the representation of Γ (implicit, general or explicit) and s (implicit or explicitly).
In the following algorithms we will make use of the function utility that computes the utility for player i of a given
terminal history, using the adequate implementation, which depends on the game representation. The same convention
applies, for extensive games, with function player that implements the player function.
Lemma 4.15. Given an extensive game Γ , a player i, and a value u checking whether Γ is (i,u)-blocking, can be done in polynomial
time when Γ is represented in explicit form and in polynomial space when Γ is represented in general or implicit form.
Proof. First, let us consider how to check whether Γ is (i,u)-blocking. Consider the following function which implements
the deﬁnition of (i,u)-blocking of the game h−1Γ .
function blocking(i,u,h): boolean
if h ∈ Z
then return (utility(h, i) u)
end if
if i = player(h)
then
for all a ∈ next(h) do
if ¬ blocking(i,u,ha) then return false end if
end for
return true
else
for all a ∈ next(h) do
if blocking(i,u,ha) then return true end if
end for
return false
end if
end
The algorithm for checking the blocking property has as input a game Γ , a player i and a value u and returns
blocking(i,u, λ).
Observe that in the recursive calls to function blocking the variable h is a pointer to the subgame h−1Γ . However, we
always use the player and utility functions of the game Γ .
Let us analyze the computational complexity of the function blocking depending on the different input representations.
When Γ is given in general or implicit form, the length of the longest history length(Γ ) is given in unary as a component
of the description. Furthermore, the maximum number of successive recursive calls is bounded by length(Γ ) and each
recursive call requires to keep a preﬁx of a terminal history. Thus, function blocking is executed in polynomial space. When
Γ is represented in explicit form, since the tree game is a part of the representation, the blocking function is executed in
polynomial time as it passes only once through any tree node. 
Lemma 4.16. Given an extensive game Γ and a terminal history z, checking whether z is Γ -stable can be done in polynomial time
when Γ is represented in explicit form, and in polynomial space when Γ is represented in general or implicit form.
Proof. A straightforward translation of the recursive deﬁnition given in page 1182, leads to the following function
function stable(h, z): boolean
if h ∈ Z then return true end if
i = player(h)
u = utility(hz, i);
Compute the symbol aiβ ∈ next(h) for which z = aiβ zβ
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for all aiα ∈ next(h) with aiα 	= aiβ do
if ¬ blocking(i,u,haiα ) then return false end if
end for
return true
end
The algorithm for checking stability has as input a game and a terminal history z and returns stable(λ, z). Observe that the
successive recursive calls to function stable follow a depth ﬁrst traversal of the tree associated to Γ and we get the same
complexity bounds as in Lemma 4.15. 
Lemma 4.17. Given an extensive game Γ and a terminal history z, checking whether z is Γ -ﬁxable can be done in polynomial time
when Γ is represented in explicit form, and in polynomial space when Γ is represented in general or implicit form.
Proof. In this case we can translate the recursive deﬁnition of Γ -ﬁxable given in page 1182 into the following non-
deterministic recursive function that has as parameters two histories. The ﬁrst parameter is the history determining the
actual game h−1Γ and the second parameter is the terminal history in z ∈ h−1 Z that we are checking for ﬁxability.
function fixable(h, z): boolean
if h ∈ Z then return true end if
i = player(h)
u = utility(hz, i)
Compute the symbol aiβ ∈ next(h) for which z = aiβ zβ
if ¬ fixable(haiβ , zβ ) then return false end if
for all aiα ∈ next(h) with aiα 	= aiβ do
Guess zα ∈ Zα
if ¬ fixable(haiα , zα) then return false end if
end for
return true
end
The algorithm for checking ﬁxability has as input a game and a terminal history z and returns fixable(λ, z). It is easy to see
that it can be executed in space polynomial on the length of the game tree. Notice that in the stack of recursive calls we
keep only a history. The above algorithm can be simulated by a deterministic one using standard techniques, maintaining
the overall space bounded by a polynomial.
In order to prove a polynomial time cost in the size of tree, we provide a bottom-up algorithm on the game, tree allowing
to compute recursively the following information
Fixable(h) = {z ∣∣ z is a terminal history in h−1Γ which is h−1Γ -ﬁxable}.
Observe that once Fixable(λ) has been computed it remains to check whether z ∈ Fixable(λ). This set can be constructed
bottom-up as follows
Fixable(h) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
{λ} for h ∈ Z ,
{aiβ zβ | aiβ ∈ next(h) and zβ ∈ Fixable(haiβ ) and h /∈ Z ,
∀aiα ∈ next(h) aiα 	= aiβ ,
∃zα ∈ Fixable(haiα )ui(haiβ zβ) ui(haiα zα)}.
Notice that each recursive construction takes time at most O (|H|), taking into account that in total we have to recompute
the set for every history, the overall time is O (|H|2). 
5. The complexity of problems on extensive games
In this section we analyze the complexity of the set of problems presented in Section 3 when the input is an exten-
sive game. For all the problems we get the same complexity classiﬁcation independently of whether the input game is
represented in implicit or in general form. In those cases we will show membershipness only for the implicit form, the
most succinct representation, and hardness only for the general form. Most of the membershipness proofs to P, NP, coNP,
or PSPACE follow as a consequence of the recursive characterization of the outcomes of Nash and subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium given in Section 4. Our PSPACE-hardness results follow from reductions from the PSPACE-complete Quantiﬁed
boolean formula (QBF) problem [23]. The NP-hardness follow from reductions from Satisﬁability (SAT), the coNP-hardness
follow from reductions from Tautology. These problems are known to be NP, coNP, and PSPACE complete, respectively
[23,32]:
SAT: Given a boolean formula F decide whether F is satisﬁable.
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Summary of gadget games used to classify the problems on extensive games given
in implicit or general form.
Problem Reduction from Gadget game
IsPN and IsSPN Tautology OneGuessFalse(F )
IsBR Tautology TwoGuessFalse(F )
BRGrant SAT BetterTrue(F )
PNGrant QBF OneWinSat(Φ)
SPNGrant QBF TwoGuessSat(Φ)
Fig. 6. The extensive games OneGuessFalse(F ) and TwoGuessFalse(F ) associated to a boolean formula F .
Tautology: Given a boolean formula F decide whether F is satisﬁed by all truth assignments.
QBF: Given a boolean formula F over n variables decide whether the quantiﬁed boolean formula Φ ≡ ∃x1∀x2 . . . Q xn
F (x1, . . . , xn) is true.
In the following subsections we present in detail the complexity classiﬁcation of the IsPn, IsSPN, IsBR, BRGrant, PNGrant
and, SPNGrant problems. We provide ﬁrst some generic construction of gadget games derived from boolean formulas. Those
games are the basis for our hardness proofs for the problems on extensive games given in implicit or general form. The role
played by such games is summarized in Table 2. Finally we comment on how those results can be extended in order to
classify the remaining problems IsPnOut, IsSPNOut,IsBRout and IsBROut.
In the remaining of the paper we will deﬁne several gadget games. Those games will constitute the main part of our
reductions. For all of them it trivially follows that a representation of the game, in the adequate form for the reduction
(general or implicit), can be obtained in polynomial time. In all the cases the tm describing the utility functions of the game
can be derived for a tm evaluating a boolean formula or a circuit quadratic time. In consequence we will omit this step in
all our hardness proofs.
5.1. Checking properties of strategies
In order to prove hardness for the problems IsPN, IsSPN and IsBR, we consider two extensive games OneGuessFalse and
TwoGuessFalse associated to a boolean formula F with n variables, a tree representation of those games is given in Fig. 6.
OneGuessFalse(F ): The game has just one player, N = {1}, that plays n+1 times. The set of histories is H = {λ, v}∪ g{h ∈
{0,1}n | |h| n}, the set of terminal histories is Z = {v} ∪ g{0,1}n . The utility function, for z ∈ Z is given by
u1(z) =
{
0 if z = v,
1− F (z′) if z = gz′.
TwoGuessFalse(F ): The game has two players, N = {1,2}. Player 2 just starts the game with a ﬁrst action f , and never
plays again. After this player 1 plays n + 1 times. The set of histories is H = {λ, f , f v} ∪ f g{h ∈ {0,1}n | |h| n}, the set
of terminal histories is Z = { f v} ∪ f g{0,1}n . The utility function, for z ∈ Z is given by
u2(z) = 0 and u1(z) =
{
0 if z = f v,
′ ′1− F (z ) if z = f gz .
1188 C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197The main properties of those gadget games are summarized in the following results.
Lemma 5.1. Let F be a boolean formula on n variables. Consider the strategy s1 for player 1 on OneGuessFalse(F ) deﬁned as follows
s1(h) =
{
v if h = λ,
0 if h = gh′ with h′ ∈ {0,1}∗ and |h′| < n.
Then, the following statements are equivalent
• F is a tautology.
• s1 is a Nash equilibrium in OneGuessFalse(F ).
• s1 is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in OneGuessFalse(F ).
Proof. Let Γ = OneGuessFalse(F ), let us prove ﬁrst that when F is a tautology, s1 is a Nash equilibrium. Note that O (s1) =
v and u1(s1) = 0. If F is a tautology, 0 is the best value for player 1, therefore s1 is a Nash equilibrium. If F is not a tautology
there exists z′ such that F (z′) = 0. Suppose z′ = x1x2 . . . xn , this case gz′ is a terminal history and player 1 has incentive to
change into a new strategy s′1 such that O (s′1) = gz′ because in this case u1(s′1) = 1.
Finally, let us prove that s1 is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium iff F is a tautology. When F is a tautology, for any
hz′ ∈ Z in Γ it holds u1(hz′) = 0. Therefore, for any subgame h−1Γ the utility veriﬁes h−1u1(z′) = 0. Player 1 has no
incentive to change h−1s1 because payoff cannot be improved in any way. When F is not a tautology, we have to prove that
there is a subgame in Γ where player 1 has an incentive to deviate from s1. We can take g−1Γ (Φ) as a subgame, changing
from g−1s1 to g−1s′1 player 1 will improve their payoff from 0 to 1. 
Lemma 5.2. Let F be a boolean formula on n variables and consider the associated game TwoGuessFalse(F ) and the strategy s1 for
player 1 deﬁned as follows
s1(h) =
{
v if h = f ,
0 if h = f gh′ with h′ ∈ {0,1}∗ and |h′| < n,
and the strategy s2 such that s2(λ) = f . Then, F is a tautology iff s1 ∈ B1(s2).
Proof. Let Γ = TwoGuessFalse(F ) and Γ ′ = OneGuessFalse(F ) Assume that F is a tautology, in this case, any terminal
history z gives to player 1 utility 0. Since the best utility that player 1 can obtain is 0, any strategy s′1 veriﬁes u1(s′1, s2) = 0
i.e. s′1 ∈ B1(s2). Since any strategy for player 1 is a best response, the strategy s1 deﬁned in this lemma is also a best
response. Finally, let us see that s1 ∈ B1(s2) holds only when F is valid. Suppose that there exists z′ such that F (z′) = 0. In
game f −1Γ = Γ ′ , player 1 can take the strategy s′1 deﬁned in Lemma 5.1 and extend this strategy into an strategy in Γ
deﬁning t1 = s(∅, s′1), then u1(t1, s2) = 1 and s1 /∈ B1(s2). 
Theorem 5.3. The IsPN, the IsSPN and the IsBR problems are coNP-complete for extensive games given in implicit or general form
when the strategy is also represented implicitly. For games given in explicit form the problems belong to P.
Proof. The problems can be formalized in terms of terminal histories instead of strategies as follows:
IsPN= {〈Γ, s〉 ∣∣ ∀i ∈ N ∀ti ∈ Si ui(s−i, ti) ui(s)}=
{
〈Γ, s〉 ∣∣ ∀i ∈ N ∀z ∈ H(s−i) ui(z) ui(s)
}
,
IsSPN= {〈Γ, s〉 ∣∣ ∀h ∈ H h−1s is a Nash equilibrium in h−1Γ },
IsBR= {〈Γ, i, s−i, si〉 ∣∣ ∀ti ∈ Si ui(s−i, ti) ui(s−i, si)}= {〈Γ, i, s−i, si〉 ∣∣ ∀z ∈ H(s−i) ∩ Z ui(z) ui(s−i, si)}.
Observe that, as a consequence of Theorems 4.8 and 4.13 and Lemmas 4.16 and 4.17, when the input game is given in
general or implicit form, the problems belong to coNP and when the input game is given in explicit form the problems can
be solved in polynomial time.
For the hardness part we consider the following polynomial reductions:
• Tautology to IsPN or IsSPN. Construct the game OneGuessFalse(F ) and the strategy proﬁle s1 described in Lemma 5.1.
• Tautology to IsBR. Construct the game TwoGuessFalse(F ) together with the strategies s−1 = s2 and s1 deﬁned in
Lemma 5.2.
This concludes the proof. 
In order to prove hardness for the BRGrant, we consider the following extensive game deﬁned from a boolean formula
F with n variables.
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BetterTrue(F ): The game has two players, N = {1,2}. Player 2 starts the game performing the ﬁrst action f and on
player 1 follows guessing an assignment for the variables in F . The set of terminal histories is Z = f {0,1}n . The utilities
are u2(z) = 0 and u1(z) = F (z′), if z = f z′ .
Observe that for the strategy s2(λ) = f and, we have that F ∈ SAT iff for any s1 ∈ B1(s2), u1(s1, s2) = 1. Using this fact
and similar arguments as in the proof of the previous results we get.
Theorem 5.4. For extensive games given in general or implicit form, the BRGrant problem is NP-complete. When the game is given in
explicit form, the problem belongs to P.
5.2. Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium problems
Given a QBF formula Φ we deﬁne two extensive games (see Fig. 7).
OneWinSat(Φ): The game has two players and A1 = A2 = {0,1}. The set of histories is H = {h ∈ {0,1}∗ | |h|  n} and
Z = {0,1}n . The utility function is given by u1(z) = F (z) and u2(z) = 1− u1(z), for z ∈ Z .
TwoGuessSat(Φ): The game has two players, A1 = {0,1} and A2 = {a,b,0,1} and is deﬁned as Γ (2,a,b,Γλ(1,0),
OneWinSat(Φ)).
We prove ﬁrst the results related to the game OneWinSat(Φ) and after the results related to the game TwoGuessSat(Φ).
Lemma 5.5. Let Φ be a quantiﬁed boolean formula on n variables, the following statements are equivalent
• Φ is true.
• OneWinSat(Φ) has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrst player gets utility 1.
• OneWinSat(Φ) has a Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrst player gets utility 1.
Proof. Let Γ = OneWinSat(Φ). First, let us prove that when Φ is a satisﬁable quantiﬁed boolean formula then Γ has
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s for which u1(s) = 1. The proof is done by induction on the number n of variables
in Φ .
When n = 0 all formulas are satisﬁable. In such a case the associated game is an empty game and its unique strategy is
a subgame perfect Nash in which player 1 gets payoff 1.
When n = 1, consider the strategy proﬁle s in Γ deﬁned s as s(λ) = 0 when F (0) = 1, otherwise s(λ) = 1. Since either
F (0) or F (1) are true, the value received by player 1 is maximum among all possible histories, therefore s is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium by Lemma 4.10.
Assume that the conditions in the lemma are true for any QBF on 1  k < n variables. Given a satisﬁable QBFΦ ≡
∃x1 ∀x2 ∃x3 . . . Q xn F (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn), there exists a truth value assignment for x1 (we assume, without loose of general-
ity, that x1 = 0) such that the following two formulas are satisﬁable
Φ(0,0) ≡ ∃x3 . . . Q xn F (0,0, x3, . . . , xn),
Φ(0,1) ≡ ∃x3 . . . Q xn F (0,1, x3, . . . , xn).
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game perfect Nash equilibrium with utility 1 for the ﬁrst player. Let r1 and r2 be the corresponding subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in the subgames (00)−1Γ and (01)−1Γ , for which u1(r1) = u1(r2) = 1 and, of course, u2(r1) = u2(r2) = 0.
Deﬁne the strategy proﬁle r on 0−1Γ as r = s(0, r1, r2), clearly r veriﬁes the one-deviation property and thus it is
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in 0−1Γ . Let t be (any) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in 1−1Γ , and deﬁne s =
s(0, r, t). Since u1(s) = 1, s veriﬁes the one-deviation property, and by construction it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Second, let us prove that if Γ has a Nash equilibrium s for which u1(s) = 1 (therefore u2(s) = 0) then Φ is satisﬁable.
We use the notation 0 = 1 and 1 = 0. Consider any preﬁx h′a of h = O (s) for which P (h′) = 2. Notice that
(h′a)−1u1((h′a)−1s) = 1 otherwise player 2 will have an incentive to change their strategy and s will not be a Nash equi-
librium. Furthermore, (h′a)−1s is a Nash equilibrium in (h′a)−1Γ , notice that the utility that player 1 gets is maximum and
therefore player 1 cannot increase its payoff. Player 2 is bound to get payoff 0, otherwise s will not be a Nash equilibrium.
Now we proceed by induction on the number of quantiﬁers of the formula. It is easy to see that the statement of the
lemma is true for formulas with 0 or 1 quantiﬁers.
Assume that Φ has n quantiﬁers and let h = a1 . . .an be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium s with u1(s) = 1 in Γ =
OneWinSat(Φ). By the previous observation we know that s induces a Nash equilibrium in both (a1a2)−1Γ and (a1a2)−1Γ .
By induction hypothesis this means that both Φ(a1,a2) and Φ(a1,a2) are true. Therefore Φ is also true. 
Lemma 5.6. Let Φ be a quantiﬁed boolean formula on n variables, the following statements are equivalent
• Φ is true.
• The history a is the outcome of some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game TwoGuessSat(Φ).
• The history a is the outcome of some Nash equilibrium of TwoGuessSat(Φ).
Proof. Given Φ , let Γ = OneWinSat(Φ) and Γ ′ = TwoGuessSat(Φ). Let us prove that, when Φ is satisﬁable, a is the
outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Γ ′ . By Lemma 5.5, when Φ is satisﬁable Γ has a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium s such that u1(s) = 1, then t = s(a,∅, s) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Γ ′ with u1(t) = 1.
Let us prove that when a is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium s in Γ ′ , then Φ is satisﬁable. Recall that Γ ′ =
Γ (2,a,b,Γλ(1,0),Γ ) and thus the Nash equilibrium can be decomposed as s = s(a,∅, t). Let us show that t = (t1, t2)
is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame Γ . Since O (s) = a, player 2 has u2(s) = 0. Therefore, in Γ , player 2 must have
u2(t1, t2) = 0, otherwise a change from s2 to s′2 = s(b,∅, t2) in Γ will improve their payoff.
As u2(t1, t2) = 0 for player 1 in Γ we must have u1(t1, t2) = 1. In such a situation player 1 has no incentive to change
t1 because it has the maximum value. Assume that t′2 is a strategy for player 2 in Γ such that u2(t1, t′2) = 1, in such a case
u2(s1, t′2) = 1, and thus (s1, s2) was not a Nash equilibrium in Γ ′ . Therefore Γ has a Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrst
player gets utility 1, according to Lemma 5.5, Φ is satisﬁable. 
Now we can analyze the complexity of problems related to pure Nash equilibria in extensive games.
Theorem 5.7. The PNGrant and the SPNGrant problems for extensive games given in general or implicit form are PSPACE-complete,
even when the number of players is a ﬁxed constant k  2 and the maximum number of actions available to any player is a ﬁxed
constant l 2. When the game is given in explicit form, both problems belong to P.
Proof. As a consequence of Theorems 4.8 and 4.13 and Lemmas 4.16 and 4.17, when the input game is given in general or
implicit form, the problems belong to PSPACE and, when the input game is given in explicit form, the problems can be
solved in polynomial time.
For the hardness part we consider the polynomial reduction from QBF that associates to a QBF formula Φ the game
OneWinSat(Φ) and set u = 1. Observe that by Lemma 5.5, if OneWinSat(Φ) has a Nash equilibrium (or a subgame Nash
equilibrium), the utility for the ﬁrst player is 1.
Finally, observe that the number of players in the games constructed in the above reduction is 1 or 2. The set of actions
for player 2 can be reduced in the game OneWinSat(Φ) by relating a by 0 and b by 1. 
In the case of extensive games there is an outcome associated to every strategy proﬁle, therefore problems like the
IsBR, the EPN and the SPN can be stated replacing strategy by outcome. The previous results hold also for the problems
of determining if a given terminal history is the outcome of a best response, a Nash equilibrium or, a subgame Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.8. The IsPNOut and the IsSPNOut problems for extensive games given in general or implicit form are PSPACE-complete.
The IsBROut problem for extensive games given in general or implicit form are coNP-complete. When the game is given in explicit
form, the three problems belong to P.
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Summary of gadget games used in the hardness proofs for problems on strategic games.
Problem Red. from Gadget game Game representation
EPN and PNGrant Q2SAT NashWhenTrue(Φ) implicit
EPN and PNGrant SAT NashWhenSat(F ) general
EPN and PNGrant CVP NashWhenOne(C, x) general, k-players
BRGrant SAT SBetterTrue(F ) implicit
6. The complexity of problems on strategic games
We analyze the complexity of the game problems introduced in Section 3 but now for the case of strategic games. We
show that the problems get harder when the representation of the input become more succinct. Contrasting with the exten-
sive games, the complexity of such problems increases when we go from general representation to implicit representation.
In particular we show that the EPN problem is Σ p2 -complete for implicit representations, while it is NP-complete for general
representations, and P-complete for explicit representations.
In order to prove the hardness for Σ p2 we consider a restricted version of the Quantiﬁed Boolean Formula, the Q2SAT
problem, which is Σ p2 -complete. We say that Φ is a Q2-formula when Φ has the form
Φ = ∃α1, . . . ,αn ∀β1, . . . , βmF (α1, . . . ,αn, β1, . . . , βm)
where F is a Boolean formula. Recall that Q2SAT is deﬁned as follows:
Q2SAT: Given a Q2-formula Φ over the boolean variables α1, . . . ,αn and β1, . . . , βm , decide whether Φ is true.
To show hardness for the class P we consider the Circuit Value Problem (CVP):
CVP: Given 〈C, x〉 where C is a description of a boolean circuit with n input gates and one output gate, and x is an
assignment of 0,1 values to C ’s input gates, decide whether C(x) outputs 1.
In the following subsections we present the complexity classiﬁcation of the EPN and PNGrant problems. As before we
will provide ﬁrst some gadget games associated to boolean formulas. Those games are the basis for our hardness proofs.
The role played by such games is summarized in Table 3.
Before presenting our results we introduce two functions that will be used in the deﬁnition of several reductions as part
of the deﬁnition of the utilities of some games. Given a property P and two values a,b ∈ {0,1}, we consider the following
functions:
g1(a,b, P ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
5 if P is true,
4 if P is false ∧ a = 0∧ b = 1,
3 if P is false ∧ a = 1∧ b = 1,
2 if P is false ∧ a = 1∧ b = 0,
1 if P is false ∧ a = 0∧ b = 0,
g2(a,b, P ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
5 if P is true,
3 if P is false ∧ a = 0∧ b = 1,
2 if P is false ∧ a = 1∧ b = 1,
1 if P is false ∧ a = 1∧ b = 0,
4 if P is false ∧ a = 0∧ b = 0.
The ﬁrst game is associated to a pair (C, x) formed by the description of a boolean circuit and a assignment to their
inputs.
NashWhenOne(C, x): There are two players 1 and 2. Their action sets are the same, A1 = A2 = {0,1}. And the pay-off
functions are
u1(a1,a2) = g1
(
a1,a2,C(x)
)
and u2(a1,a2) = g2
(
a1,a2,C(x)
)
.
The second game is associated to a boolean formula F on n variables.
NashWhenSat(F ): There are n players. Their action sets are the same, Ai = {0,1} for any 1  i  n. And the pay-off
functions are
u1(a1, . . . ,an) = g1
(
a1,a2, F (a1, . . . ,an)
)
,
u2(a1, . . . ,an) = g2
(
a1,a2, F (a1, . . . ,an)
)
, and
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u j(a1, . . . ,an) =
{
5 if F (a1, . . . ,an) is true,
1 if F (a1, . . . ,an) is false,
for j > 2.
The third game is associated to a Q2-formula Φ with n variables quantiﬁed existentially and m variables quantiﬁed univer-
sally.
NashWhenTrue(Φ): There are three players. Their action sets are, A1 = {0,1}n+1 A2 = {0,1}m and A3 = {0,1}. And the
pay-off functions are:
u1(α1 . . . αna, β1 . . . βm,b) = g1
(
a,b, F (α1, . . . ,αn, β1, . . . , βm)
)
,
u2(α1 . . . αna, β1 . . . βm,b) = 1− F (α1, . . . ,αn, β1, . . . , βm),
u3(α1 . . . αna, β1 . . . βm,b) = g2
(
a,b, F (α1, . . . ,αn, β1, . . . , βm)
)
.
Lemma 6.1. Let C be a boolean circuit and let x be an assignment of boolean values to the inputs of C , let F be a boolean formula, and
let Φ be a Q2-formula. Then we have
• NashWhenOne(C, x) has a pne iff C(x) = 1.
• NashWhenSat(F ) has a pne iff F is satisﬁable.
• NashWhenTrue(Φ) has a pne iff Φ is true.
Furthermore, the utility for the ﬁrst player, in any of the three games, of a pne is 5.
Proof. Let us start proving the ﬁrst claim. When C(x) = 1, since the utility of each player is always equal to the maximum
value 5, independently of their strategy, then no player has incentive to change their strategy. Hence, every strategy proﬁle
of NashWhenOne(C, x) is a Nash equilibrium.
Now, let us assume that C(x) = 0, it is straightforward to prove that whatever is the strategy proﬁle (a1,a2), both players
have an incentive to change their strategy. Hence, no strategy proﬁle of NashWhenOne(C, x) is a Nash equilibrium.
To prove the second claim, notice that any x for which F (x) = 1 is a Nash equilibrium for the game NashWhenSat(F ),
as all the players get utility 5. On the reverse side, when F is not satisﬁable, players 1 and 2 play the same role as players
1 and 2 in NashWhenOne(C, x) for the case in which C(x) = 0. Therefore, the game has no Nash equilibrium.
Now it remains to prove the last claim. Let us assume that Φ is true. Then there exists α ∈ {0,1}n such that for all
β ∈ {0,1}m , F (α,β) = 1. In terms of the game NashWhenTrue(Φ) this means that if player 1 plays action αa for some
a ∈ {0,1}, for all β ∈ {0,1}m and b ∈ {0,1}, player 1 and player 3 have no incentive to change their action as u1(αb, β,b) =
5 = u3(αb, β,b). Moreover, for any β ′ ∈ {0,1}m we have that u2(αa, β ′,b) = 0. Then player 2 neither has any incentive to
change their strategy.
Now, let us assume that Φ is not true. This means that for any α ∈ {0,1}n there exists β ∈ {0,1}m such that F (α,β) = 0.
Let (αa, β,b) be a strategy proﬁle. We consider two cases.
Case 1: F (α,β) = 0, in this case players 1 with its additional bit and player 3 play, the same role than players 1 and 2 of
the NashWhenOne(F (α,β)). Since the property is false players 1 and 3 always have an incentive to change their strategies
as we have shown in the proof of (1). Hence, the strategy proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium.
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incentive to change strategy β by β ′ . Therefore, the strategy proﬁle (αa, β,b) is not a pne. 
The proof of Theorem 3.4 of [24] can be adapted to show the following result.
Theorem 6.2. The IsPN problem, for strategic games given in implicit form, is coNP-complete.
At ﬁrst glance the previous results seems to imply that the hardness of the EPN problem follows trivially from the coNP-
completeness and the additional existential quantiﬁcation. It is worth noticing that this approach is false in general as it
is known that the equivalence problem for circuits is coNP-complete while the isomorphisms for circuits is not Σ p2 -hard
unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level [37]. Our next result shows the Σ p2 -hardness of the EPN problem
which is also claimed in [36].
Theorem 6.3. The EPN and the PNGrant problems for strategic games given
• in implicit form are Σ p2 -complete, even in the case that the number of players is a ﬁxed constant k 3.• in general form are NP-complete, even in the case that the number of actions of each player is a ﬁxed constant l 2.
Proof. Membership follows directly from the deﬁnition of pure Nash equilibria, using the space allowed by the corre-
sponding input representation and the fact that the utility function can be evaluated in time t , which is part of the input
description.
In order to prove the hardness we consider the following polynomial reductions:
• From Q2SAT to EPN in implicit form we use the game NashWhenTrue(Φ). By Lemma 6.1 we know that NashWhen-
True(Φ) has an pne iff Φ is valid.
• From SAT to EPN in general form we use the game NashWhenSat(F ). By Lemma 6.1 we know that F is satisﬁable iff
NashWhenSat(F ) has a pne.
Just note that in the game NashWhenTrue(Φ) or NashWhenSat(F ), according to Lemma 6.1 either there is no Nash equi-
librium or there is one, and in such a case the utility for player 1 is 5. Therefore the above reductions can be used also to
show hardness for the PNGrant.
Finally, observe that in the NashWhenSat(F ) game the number of actions available to each player is two. Thus the
NP-hardness result holds for this restricted case. 
Contrasting with the previous hardness results, we prove that the EPN and the EPN problem becomes tractable, or
games given in general form, when the number of players is a ﬁxed constant, the set of strategy proﬁles has polynomial
size, therefore the problem belongs to P. We can show in this case also P -hardness using a reduction form CVP that
constructs the game NashWhenOne(C, x). The correctness of the reduction follows from Lemma 6.1.
Theorem6.4. For any ﬁxed k 2, the EPN and the PNGrant problems for strategic games in general formwith k-players is P-complete.
Finally, we provide lower complexity bounds for the EPN and the PNGrant when the strategic game is given in explicit
form.
Lemma 6.5. The EPN and PNGrant problems for strategic games in explicit form are in AC0 .
Proof. In order to prove that EPN and PNGrant are in AC0 we show that properties deﬁning both problems can be ex-
pressed in First Order Logic. First, we recall that “equality” and “greater than” properties are in AC0 for l bit numbers. We
adopt the representation u = (u[l − 1], . . . ,u[0]) where u[k] denotes the bit number k. Given two numbers u and u′ , the
equality is given by the following predicate
EQ
(
u,u′
)= ∧
0k<l
(
u[k] = u′[k]).
In order to test u > u′ we need a position k such that leftmost part of both numbers coincide until k and u has 1 in the
position k but u′ has a 0. Formally
GTN
(
u,u′
)= ∨
0k<l
(∧
j>k
(
u[ j] = u′[ j])
)
∧ (u[k] = 1)∧ (u′[k] = 0),
note that u  u′ can be expressed as GEQ(u,u′) = EQ(u,u′) ∨ GTN(u,u′).
1194 C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197In order to prove that the EPN problem is in AC0 we write it as follows
EPN≡
∨
a∗∈A1×···×An
IsPN
(
a∗
)
,
where IsPN(a∗) ≡ (a∗ is a pne). This last predicate can be expressed as
IsPN
(
a∗
)=
n∧
i=1
BR
(
a∗, i
)
,
where BR(a∗, i) ≡ (∀ai ∈ Ai ui(a∗−i,a∗i ) ui(a∗−i,ai)). Hence, we can express BR as follows
BR
(
a∗, i
)= ∧
ai∈Ai
GEQ
(
ui
(
a∗
)
,ui
(
a∗−i,ai
))
.
Given i and u, we have
PNGrant≡
∨
a∗∈A1×···×An
(
IsPN
(
a∗
)∧ GEQ(ui(a∗),u)),
and therefore the PNGrant problem belongs to AC0 
For the BRGrant we introduce a strategic version of the BetterTrue game. Let F be a boolean formula on n variables.
SBetterTrue(F ): The game has two players, N = {1,2}, their set of actions are A1 = {0,1}n and A2 = { f }. The utilities
are
u1(x, f ) = F (x) and u2(x, f ) = 0.
Again we have that, for the strategy s2 = f , F ∈ SAT iff for any s1 ∈ B1(s2), u1(s1, s2) = 1. Following the same arguments
as in Theorem 5.4 and taking into account that the number of actions available to any player and the time to evaluate the
utility function is polynomial in the size of a game given in general form we have the following result.
Theorem 6.6. For strategic games given in implicit form, the BRGrant problem is NP-complete assuming that the strategy is also given
implicitly. For strategic games given in general or explicit form, the BRGrant is polynomial time solvable.
For the IsBr problem, we introduce a strategic version of the TwoGuessFalse gadget game. Let F be a boolean formula
on n variables.
STwoGuessFalse(F ): The game has two players, N = {1,2}, their set of actions are A1 = {v} ∪ {0,1}n and A2 = { f }. The
utilities are
u1(x, f ) =
{
0 if x = v ,
1− F (x) otherwise, u2(x, f ) = 0.
Now we have that, for the strategy s2 = f , it holds F ∈ Tautology iff s1 = v veriﬁes s1 ∈ B1(s2). Following the same
arguments as in Theorem 5.4 and taking into account that again the number of actions available to any player and the time
to evaluate the utility function is polynomial in the size of a game, when the game is given in general form. Therefore, we
have the following result.
Theorem 6.7. For strategic games given in implicit form, the IsBR problem is coNP-complete, assuming that the strategy is also given
implicitly. For strategic games given in general or explicit form, the IsBR can be solved in polynomial time.
7. Uniform families of games with polynomial time computable utilities
In the previous section we have analyzed the representations of the strategic games as potential inputs of the EPN prob-
lem. Here we are interested in families of strategic games that arise when the utility functions are computable in polynomial
time. Thus we are interested in families of games deﬁned uniformly by Turing machines. But, what does exactly mean that
a game has polynomial time computable pay-off functions? Even though in many papers studying the computational com-
plexity of some speciﬁc games, it is assumed that the utilities are computable in polynomial time (see for example [13,24,
15,16,22]) and this assumption has had different interpretations.
For instance, Gottlob et al. consider that “each player has a a polynomial time computable real-valued utility function”
however a machine computing such function is not given as part of the description of a game [24]. Fotakis et al. [13]
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players using a a delay function d mapping E ×N to the integers. The actions for each player are subsets of E . The pay-off
functions can be computed as follows:
ui(a1, . . . ,an) = −
(∑
e∈ai
d
(
e, f (a1, . . . ,an, e)
))
being f (a1, . . . ,an, e) = |{i | e ∈ ai}|.
In the second case, they consider a uniform family of games in the sense that the different instances are given by
considering different number of players, action sets and delay functions, but in each of them the pay-off functions can
be computed by a dtm which works in polynomial time with respect to n and m, being m the maximum length of the
actions ai .
Following the same spirit of Fotakis et al., for each dtmM we deﬁne uniform families of strategic games in such a way
that the pay-off functions of each game in the family are computed by M . Moreover, as in the previous section, we consider
further reﬁnements according to the input representation.
Let M be a dtm and let us assume that an alphabet Σ is ﬁxed. We deﬁne the following uniform families of games
associated to M:
M-implicit form strategic family. It is an implicit description of the family of games in which the pay-off functions are
computed by the dtmM . Each instance of the family speciﬁes the number of players n and their set of actions in an
succinct way.2 Formally, the M-implicit form family is deﬁned as follows:{〈
1n,1m1 , . . . ,1mn
〉 ∣∣ n,m1, . . . ,mn ∈N}.
In the game described by 〈1n,1m1 , . . . ,1mn 〉, if a is an strategy proﬁle of such a game, and 1 i  n, then the utility of
the i-th player on a is deﬁned as ui(a) = M(a, i).
M-general form strategic family. It is a general form description of the family of games in which the pay-off functions
are computed by M . Each instance of the family describes a game by giving the number of players n and the set of
actions of each player. Here, every set of actions is given by listing all its elements. Formally, the M-general form family
is deﬁned as follows:{〈
1n, A1, . . . , An
〉 ∣∣ n,m ∈N∧ ∀i Ai is given by listing all its elements in Σ∗}.
As in the M-implicit form, in the game described by 〈1n, A1, . . . , An〉, if a is an strategy proﬁle of such game, and
1 i  n, then the utility of the i-th player on a is deﬁned as ui(a) = M(a, i).
We have adopted the more general deﬁnition of uniform game as our games allow a reinterpretation not only parame-
terized by the number of players but also by the length of the actions allowed to each player.
In the case of extensive games, we have to take into account that games are deﬁned by a pair of tm, nevertheless we
will make use of a unique tm that implements a combination of the two machines as follows when the input is a history h
and a 0 the machine outputs p(h) and when the input is a history h and a i > 0 the machine outputs ui(h).
M-implicit form extensive family. A game is a tuple Γ = 〈1n,1m,1h〉. This game has n players. For any i, 1 i  n, the
set of actions of player i is Σm . The set H of histories is a subset of Σmh .
M-general form extensive family. A game is described by a tuple Γ = 〈1n, A1, . . . , An,1h〉. The game has n players.
For any i, 1  i  n, the set of actions of player i is Ai , which is given explicitly. The set H of histories is a subset of
(
⋃
1in Ai)
h .
Hence, given a family of games deﬁned from a polynomial time dtmM , we can also pose the question of determining
whether a game of this family has a Nash equilibrium.
M-Exists pure Nash (M-EPN)
Given a game Γ , deﬁned uniformly by M , decide whether Γ has a Pure Nash equilibrium.
M-Pure Nash equilibrium with guarantee (M-PNGrant)
Given a game Γ , deﬁned uniformly by M , a value u, and a player i, decide whether Γ has a pure Nash equilibrium in
which player i gets payoff u.
2 In the games in implicit form we assume Ai = Σmi . We can also consider Ai ⊆ Σmi . In this case the machine M has to be able to recognize
whether a given action ai belongs to Ai .
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obtain different hardness results. The games obtained through a reduction provide, in all the cases an example of a tmM ,
such that in the family of games deﬁned by M , the problem is also hard. As an example we show that the M-EPN problem
for the implicit form strategic games is Σ p2 -complete for a particular polynomial time dtmM , while the M
′-EPN problem
for the general form games is NP-complete.
Theorem 7.1.
• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-EPN problem for games in the M-implicit form strategic family is Σ p2 -
complete.
• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-EPN problem for games in the M-general form strategic family is NP-
complete.
• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-implicit form strategic family is
Σ
p
2 -complete.• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-general form strategic family is
NP-complete.
• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-implicit form extensive family is
PSPACE-complete.
• There exists a polynomial time dtmM for which the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-general form extensive family is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Observe that, since we are considering uniform families of games, the main difference with respect to the proofs of
the analogous results in the previous section is that the dtm computing the utilities of the game deﬁned in each one of
the reductions is not parameterized by the quantiﬁed boolean formula Φ in the case of the Σ p2 -hardness results, or by the
boolean formula F in the case of the coNP or NP-hardness results. Now these formulae will be part of the input of the
machines as a strategy for some player. We provide a complete proof of the ﬁrst result.
Following the same arguments of the membership proof of Theorem 6.3, for any ﬁxed polynomial time dtmM , the prob-
lem of deciding whether a game Γ in M-implicit form has a pne can be solved by an Alternating tm, with 2 alternations,
existential and universal, in polynomial time. Hence M-EPN ∈ Σ p2 .
In order to prove the hardness, we have to deﬁne ﬁrst the polynomial time dtmM . Let M be the tm such that on
input (Φ,a1,a2,a3, i) where Φ is an instance of the Q2SAT problem, Φ = ∃α1, . . . ,αn1 ∀β1, . . . , βn2 F , a1 ∈ A1 = {0,1}n1+1,
a2 ∈ A2 = {0,1}n2 and a3 ∈ {0,1}, computes the utilities deﬁned of the game NashWhenTrue(Φ) deﬁned in Section 6, but
now we consider that the quantiﬁed boolean formula Φ is an element of the input. It is easy to see that M works in
polynomial time with respect to the input length.
Once we have deﬁned M , we can show that Q2SAT can be reduced to M-EPN in implicit form. For each Φ we de-
ﬁne a game Γ (Φ) with four players. Players 1, 2 and 3 are deﬁned exactly equal to the three players of the game
NashWhenTrue(Φ). The difference is that now we have an additional player, player 0 who has a unique action that deﬁnes
the rules of the game, i.e. A0 = {Φ}. As we have shown in Lemma 6.1, Φ is true if and only if NashWhenTrue(Φ) has a pne,
which is equivalent to say that Γ (Φ) has a pne. Furthermore, the description of the game Γ (Φ) in implicit form can be
obtained in polynomial time.
Using similar arguments we can modify the hardness proof of the theorems in Sections 5 and 6, by consider an addi-
tional player whose set of actions contains only the input formula for the reduction, to obtain the result. 
Membership for a class follows from the same arguments as for the non-uniform case, taking into account that M works
in polynomial time.
Theorem 7.2. For any polynomial time dtmM,
• the M-EPN problem for games in the M-implicit form strategic family is in Σ p2 while for games in the M-general form strategic
family is in NP,
• the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-implicit form strategic family is in Σ p2 while for games in the M-general form
strategic family is in NP, and
• the M-PNGrant problem for games in the M-implicit form extensive family or the M-general form extensive family is in PSPACE.
Similar results can be obtained for the remaining set of problems considered in this paper, for the adequate complexity
classes.
If we consider the results presented in [24], they propose to study, among many other problems, the complexity of the
EPN problem for games in⋃
M∈polyTM
M-general form family,
where polyTM is the class of tm working in polynomial time. They assume that the utility functions of their games are
polynomially computable functions and they show that deciding whether a game in general form has a pne is NP-complete.
C. Àlvarez et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 1172–1197 1197To prove the membership in NP, they strongly need to make use of the assumption that the utilities are polynomial time
computable. However, in their hardness result, they construct polynomial time computable utilities, but the utilities are
non-uniform in the sense that for each instance they get a different utility function.
Our contribution is different, for the uniform families our reduction produce a Turing machine for all the game instances.
Furthermore, in the previous section, for non-uniform families of games, we give a general way of describing all the games
with “computable utilities”. In order to prove our complexity results, we do not have to assume that the description of the
pay-off functions can be given as polynomial time dtm, we represent any ‘computable’ pay-off function by giving a dtm and
a natural number t (in unary) bounding its computation time.
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